A sobering near miss aboard the USS Harry S. Truman underscores how fragile readiness can be when a ship’s bridge team falters. This incident, near the Port Said area, should spur a national conversation about naval discipline and accountability.

More than 100 sailors were sleeping a few dozen yards from the point of impact when a merchant vessel slammed into the Truman’s steel hull near Port Said, Egypt, on Feb. 12, according to a Navy investigation released on Thursday. Another group of eight sailors was on duty in a compartment just 10 feet from the impact.

Rear Adm. Todd E. Whalen, commander of Carrier Strike Group 3, endorsed the investigation and warned that the threat was not theoretical.

“A small change in the timing of the collision or the angle of the impact could have caused catastrophic results.” He added, “Had the collision occurred 100 ft forward, the impact would have likely pierced a berthing compartment with 120 sleeping sailors.”

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Whalen also noted the proximity of danger to eight sailors.

“Eight sailors were in a space that was less than 10 feet from where the two vessels collided.” He further warned, “A 1-degree change in trajectory could have destroyed the space and caused eight fatalities.”

“My team spoke with those eight sailors, and they will never forget how close they came to losing their lives. Neither should we.”

Capt. Dave Snowden was fired as the Truman’s commanding officer shortly after the collision.

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The inquiry compared the incident to the 2017 destroyer USS Fitzgerald collision, saying both were “caused by Bridge teams’ and supporting watchstanders’ poor decisions and failures in Bridge Resource Management (BRM).”

The contrast is striking because BRM failures are not accidents; they are preventable lapses in training and discipline.

At 10:55 p.m. that evening, the captain left the bridge and went to his cabin, planning to sleep until 3 a.m., the investigation found.

After he left, the Truman’s speed was recorded at 19 knots, faster than its planned speed of 10 knots, and there were several other vessels in the area at the time.

This divergence from plan speaks to a broader culture of risk rather than cautious operation.

Later, the captain told the officer of the deck to notify him if any other vessels came within 1,000 yards of the Truman.

However, as the Truman passed other vessels, the officer did not consult with the captain or sailors in the combat information center, which normally provides information for navigation.

At 11:29, when the Truman had planned to be traveling at just 5 knots, it was still steaming at 19 knots.

At one point, the sailors standing watch on the bridge misjudged the direction that the merchant vessel Besiktas-M was turning.

The officer of the deck tried to raise the Besiktas-M’s bridge but got no response. The captain was called to the bridge, and the Truman sounded five blasts from its horn to signal danger.

By the time the captain arrived on the bridge, the Besiktas-M was only 500 yards away. The officer of the deck ordered hard left rudder, but just 15 seconds later the captain gave the opposite order: Hard right rudder. At 11:45 p.m., the two ships collided.

The initial impact created a gash along the Truman’s hull that investigators measured at 20 feet long and 7 feet wide.

“Additional contact with the hull produced a 15-ft gash spanning portions of the aviation parachute equipment shop (which was manned by eight sailors), an unmanned tire storeroom, an unmanned line handling space, a void, and the fantail,” the investigation says.

Yet, despite the damage, the collision did not cause any fires, flooding, electrical damage, or injuries among the crew, and flight operations from the carrier were not affected.

The findings also point to lessons in navigational decision making.

The investigation’s recommendation included making changes to tests about navigational rules on avoiding collisions by replacing multiple choice with short answers; considering opening navigator billets to surface warfare officers instead of just aviators; and possibly developing a training module for how commanders and executive officers can manage fatigue to include “the use of wearable technology to help COs/XOs monitor their performances, sleep, and resilience similar to professional athletes.”

This last point aligns with a growing push in several branches to strengthen readiness through better fatigue management and data-driven oversight.

Additionally, the Navy released the findings of three other investigations on Thursday that looked into three mishaps Truman lost three F/A-18F Super Hornets during its deployment, including one that was accidentally shot down by the cruiser USS Gettysburg.

Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jim Kilby framed the broader message: “The Navy’s sustained combat operations in the U.S. Central Command area of operations for the past two years demonstrated our battle effectiveness and ability to maintain freedom of navigation.”

In this moment, a President who prioritizes a strong, ready military and a Secretary of War like Pete Hegseth would press for rapid improvements.

They would insist on accountability, tighter BRM discipline, and robust fatigue management to prevent a repeat of this near-disaster.

The events at Port Said should be a catalyst for smarter training, clearer lines of authority, and a more vigilant bridge crew culture—principles that underpin a capable, modern navy prepared to defend American interests.

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