President Trump has floated a dramatic idea: take possession of Greenland to shield the United States from missile threats. Yet the justification for such a move is fading as policy debates shift to the Golden Dome missile defense scheme.

The claim that Greenland is essential is not supported by the facts. Pushing the issue could backfire on American security.

One line of argument asserts that the United States must control Greenland to neutralize missile threats. The claim that Greenland is essential is captured by the assertion "The U.S. needs to acquire Greenland to protect itself against missile attacks."

However, as the author notes, "It does not, and forcing the issue actually weakens U.S. national security." Therefore, the push for Greenland is not the correct path, even as the debate around Golden Dome accelerates.

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Golden Dome is described as a multilayered system meant to defend the nation from ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and even drones.

The plan would combine elements of existing defenses into a system of systems that includes layers along the ground and in space.

It would use sensors across the spectrum, including a radar that has long been part of the early warning network, located at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland. The appeal is straightforward in tone, but the stakes are higher than simple geography.

A close look at the fiscal and strategic realities shows that claims about Greenland should be weighed against current capabilities.

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The reports also note that "due to insufficient budgetary information, the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees were unable to effectively assess resources available to specific program elements and to conduct oversight of planned programs and projects for fiscal year 2026 Golden Dome efforts in consideration of the final agreement," yet they "support the operational objectives of Golden Dome for national security."

In other words, the money and the mission are not yet fully aligned, and rushing a foreign base decision would risk misallocating scarce defense resources.

The legal framework for any expansion into Greenland remains elastic. The terms of the 1951 agreement between the U.S. and Denmark are very flexible.

It says that the U.S. has the right “to improve and generally to fit the area for military use” and “to construct, install, maintain, and operate facilities and equipment,” as well as having “the right of free access to and movement between the defense areas through Greenland” and “the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over those defense areas in Greenland.”

These provisions have guided past adjustments, including upgrades during the George W. Bush administration, when a request to the Danish parliament was unanimously approved in 2004. Yet the current reporting surrounding Golden Dome emphasizes space based sensors rather than new ground based ones.

What about placing interceptors in Greenland? Again, under the current military agreement, the U.S. could already do this. But even so, Greenland is not needed as a new interceptor site.

The U.S. has 44 GMD interceptors fielded in Alaska and California, and the Missile Defense Agency has received funding to create a third basing site for GMD interceptors at Fort Drum, New York. This arrangement accommodates any need for a more northern position without requiring a site outside the United States.

The fact remains that the number of fielded GMD interceptors has been 44 for over 20 years; these are expensive to build, operate and maintain, and MDA has been focused more on upgrades than on expanding the supply.

So it is not like there is a waiting warehouse full of GMD interceptors. And the GMD system is the only system intended to defend against ICBMs.

Further, forcibly annexing Greenland does nothing to bolster U.S. national security — rather the opposite. By menacing a NATO ally, the United States weakens a military alliance that has served us well for over seven decades. Space Force officials have repeatedly said that one of our strongest assets are our international partners and allies.

This move kneecaps strategies put in place by the Space Force to utilize them, including its International Partnership Strategy released in July 2025. Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said at the time, “Spacepower is the ultimate team sport. … Therefore, if the service is to achieve its mission to secure our nation’s interests in, from, and to space, then it absolutely must cultivate partnerships with partners upon whom it can depend on.”

Golden Dome is problematic for many reasons, including its astronomical cost, technical complexity and contribution to the weaponization of space. Don’t let it be used to justify the annexation of a NATO ally’s territory as well.

Victoria Samson is chief director of space security and stability for the Secure World Foundation where Krystal Azelton is senior director of program planning.

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