WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
- GAO found no overarching Pentagon plan linking munitions production and funding to total military requirements.
- The Army expanded 155mm shell production after shortages worsened, but GAO said the increase was not based on the department’s total requirement.
- A nearly $500 million Texas plant failed to produce any shell components.
- Investigators found discrepancies between the Munitions Readiness Initiative and military service inventory databases.
- GAO said fragmented authority has left no single office accountable for improving munitions inventories across the department.
The Pentagon is racing to expand production of missiles, artillery shells and other munitions as stockpiles remain depleted. Yet a Government Accountability Office report warns that officials are placing orders without a departmentwide plan tying production and funding to the military’s actual requirements.
“DoW does not have an overarching plan that links munitions production and funding to requirements,” the GAO study warned. That finding raises a basic question about whether the Pentagon’s manufacturing push matches the quantities and types of ammunition the military needs.
Pentagon officials acknowledged the planning gap while speaking with investigators. They said that “in lieu of a plan, DoW and the services can be reactive to global events rather than driven by total requirements.”
The public report is based on a classified study completed in September 2026. It excludes “information that DoW deemed classified or sensitive, such as trends in DoW munitions inventories, persistent shortfalls and how these shortfalls have affected DoW’s support to war plans.”
Even with those details withheld, the report points to an existing and potential mismatch between Pentagon purchases and military requirements. The issue is not whether shortages exist, but whether production decisions account for the total requirement for each munition.
The Army’s effort to increase production of 155mm howitzer shells illustrates the problem. Shortages were exacerbated by support to allies and partners, prompting the Army to push for more manufacturing capacity.
That expansion has already encountered manufacturing trouble. A new plant in Texas cost nearly $500 million but failed to produce any shell components, according to the report’s account.
The unresolved question is how many shells the Army actually requires. “The Army’s ramp-up in production of 155-millimeter artillery shells to address shortages exacerbated by U.S. support to allies and partners was not driven by a need to address DoW’s total munitions requirement,” GAO said.
Diana Moldafsky, a director of GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management team, said the department is responding to genuine shortages. But investigators identified production increases that were not based on the total requirement for the munition involved.
“DoW is taking steps to increase production in response to real shortages,” Moldafsky told Defense News. “That said, we found some cases where DoW increased production in response to immediate shortages without basing the increase on its total requirement for that munition.”
The Pentagon also lacks a reliable grasp of how much ammunition is already available. Each military service maintains its own data system for tracking munitions inventories, while the department’s Munitions Readiness Initiative aggregates that information.
The MRI is intended to provide a view of stockpiles and supply chain connections in nearly real time. “In total, MRI pulls from 37 DoW data sources through a mix of automated connections and some manually updated data,” GAO noted.
Investigators found that the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment does not consistently reconcile MRI inventory figures with the services’ own systems. The office also lacks “a data management plan detailing how data is aggregated in the MRI tool from across the services.”
“MRI does aggregate from the individual services’ data systems, but we found instances where the numbers in the tool differed from the services’ databases,” Moldafsky said. The discrepancy leaves officials relying on an aggregation tool that does not always match the underlying service records.
Authority over munitions inventories is fragmented among multiple War Department offices and program executive offices within the individual services. Working groups intended to coordinate those organizations lack both authority and accountability, leaving no single office firmly in charge.
“DoW has not identified an office or entity and delegated to it authority that empowers the leadership to make decisions that improve munitions inventories departmentwide and hold them accountable for the outcomes achieved, such as improving munitions inventory levels,” the GAO report stated. The result is a production campaign moving quickly without unified requirements, consistently reconciled inventory data or clearly accountable leadership.
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