Despite Guam’s growing strategic importance in the United States’ Indo-Pacific military posture, a new government watchdog report has revealed that the Department of War (DoW) lacks a coherent strategy for maintaining missile defense systems on the island.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report titled “DoW Faces Support Challenges for Defense of Guam,” highlighting significant gaps in planning for the long-term sustainment of the Guam Defense System (GDS).

According to the report, different military services and agencies have yet to determine who will ultimately take responsibility for operating and maintaining critical missile defense assets.

“DoW does not have a strategy that includes a timeline and a plan for determining when and how the lead organization — the military services or [Missile Defense Agency] — will assume responsibility for operating and sustaining those elements,” the GAO wrote.

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“MDA officials noted that they will fund sustainment of the systems they are developing for Guam until they fully transfer operations and sustainment to the military services.”

This lack of clarity poses a challenge for the U.S. military’s plans to turn Guam into a fortified hub capable of withstanding and responding to peer-level threats, especially from near-peer adversaries like China.

The island is intended to play a central role in America’s evolving Pacific strategy, with a robust missile shield to protect key installations and forces stationed there.

The envisioned GDS would comprise interceptor batteries, radar systems, early-warning sensors, and command and control centers — all forming what defense officials have called a “persistent, 360-degree defense” around the island.

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The latest plans call for the development of 16 sites across Guam, a scaled-down version of earlier proposals. Construction is set to begin soon, with full implementation projected between 2027 and 2032.

According to Congressional testimony earlier this month, the estimated cost for the program stands at around $8 billion.

However, sustaining such a complex and high-value network of defenses is a massive undertaking, and according to the GAO, the Pentagon hasn’t nailed down the most basic logistical and personnel planning required to do so.

Not only have the services failed to agree on who will maintain the GDS, but they have also yet to identify how many personnel will be needed or what kind of training will be required.

“The Pentagon has not fully identified the required number of personnel or completed a deployment schedule for GDS units,” the report found.

The Army, in particular, expressed concern to the GAO, stating that it cannot finalize its own staffing and deployment plans until the DoW assigns a lead agency for GDS operations and sustainment.

This organizational uncertainty isn’t new. The island currently hosts a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery, deployed more than a decade ago, but even that established asset is struggling with sustainment issues.

The GAO audit noted that the Army lacks sufficient infrastructure to independently support the THAAD battery and instead has to rely on the Navy.

During a 2023 typhoon, for example, the Army had to ask the Marine Corps for hangar space to shield the THAAD equipment from storm damage due to a lack of Army-owned facilities.

This dependency underscores the broader sustainment gaps facing the island’s growing defense footprint.

Guam’s central location and robust military infrastructure make it an ideal site for the Pentagon’s efforts to project power across the Pacific.

The buildup includes reviving World War II-era airfields, stationing additional units on the island, and expanding command and control capabilities.

The Navy’s 7th Fleet continues to provide maritime support, solidifying Guam’s status as a key outpost in deterring regional threats.

Still, none of these efforts will reach their full potential without a coordinated strategy for the long-term sustainment of the missile defense systems being installed.

The GAO made three primary recommendations to address the situation:

1. The DoW should determine the specific personnel requirements needed to support the GDS so appropriate infrastructure can be developed;
2. A comprehensive, long-term integration plan should be created for the Army to align with existing Guam bases; and
3. A clear timeline should be established for transferring sustainment responsibilities from the Missile Defense Agency to the appropriate military branches.

Until these recommendations are implemented, the defense of Guam remains vulnerable to logistical, operational, and organizational shortfalls — all of which could undermine U.S. readiness in a region where tensions continue to rise.

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