When President Joe Biden announced in March 2024 that the U.S. military would construct a floating pier to facilitate humanitarian aid to Gaza, the ambitious plan was seen as a novel way to deliver lifesaving supplies without traversing conflict zones.

Known as Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, the operation was tasked with providing a crucial lifeline to Palestinian civilians amid the escalating crisis.

Yet just months later, the project was abruptly shuttered—having operated for a mere 20 days.

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Now, a scathing report from the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (IG) reveals that the mission was hampered from the outset by deep-rooted deficiencies in planning, training, and inter-service coordination.

The report, released on a Friday, details how both the Army and Navy were unprepared to execute the complex logistics mission.

Investigators found that military planners failed to account for key environmental conditions—such as local sea states and beach geography—that are critical to the success of JLOTS operations.

Furthermore, the Army and Navy brought equipment that was not designed to work together, causing physical damage and operational delays that plagued the project from start to finish.

Despite these challenges, the mission, officially named Operation Neptune Solace, did manage to deliver a significant amount of aid. According to the IG report, approximately 19.4 million pounds of food reached Gaza during the operation’s brief active period—enough to feed around 500,000 civilians for a month.

Still, the watchdog’s assessment concludes that the operation’s overall effectiveness was “badly curtailed” by long-standing issues, many of which had been identified during earlier training exercises and evaluations.

Between 2013 and 2023, the Department of Defense conducted 11 JLOTS exercises. However, the report found that neither the Army nor the Navy maintained JLOTS packages that met their own standards for mission readiness. Specific readiness and manning data remain redacted in the public version of the report, but the consequences of under-resourcing were plainly felt.

“According to [U.S. Army 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary)] officials, manning shortages delayed the deployment of some Army watercraft for Operation Neptune Solace,” the IG wrote.

Similarly, Navy Beach Group One struggled to staff its vessels in accordance with operational requirements. “They had to pull together every person they could,” investigators noted.

That scramble was further complicated by equipment shortages stemming from years of military divestment.

Between 2018 and 2023, the Army retired nearly half of its watercraft—64 out of 134 vessels—and the Navy decommissioned one of its two JLOTS-capable units, Amphibious Construction Battalion 2. According to the report, service members involved in the Gaza deployment expressed concern that the current capabilities of JLOTS were insufficient for future operational needs.

Even more troubling was the mismatch between Army and Navy equipment. The Army’s roll-on/roll-off discharge facility and the Navy’s Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) were not designed to work in tandem.

Officials said the INLS warped Army ramps, while Army boats inflicted significant damage on Navy docks. One photo included in the report showed an Army vessel with large gouges and the words “total loss” spray-painted on its side. The Navy ultimately reported $31 million in damage across 27 vessels and associated equipment.

Personnel safety was also a concern. The report notes that 62 U.S. service members were injured during the operation, though specific details remain classified. Tragically, one soldier, Army Sgt. Quandarius Stanley, died in October 2024 from injuries sustained in May.

He had been critically hurt when high winds and rough seas caused multiple Army vessels to run aground—a vivid illustration of the unpredictable and dangerous environment the mission operated in.

Communication failures further undermined the operation.

The IG found that Army and Navy systems were not interoperable, echoing issues identified in prior exercises. At times, units were unable to securely communicate, complicating coordination and increasing operational risk.

Planning shortcomings also played a central role in the mission’s difficulties.

Despite well-known sea state limits for JLOTS operations, military planners reportedly “did not fully identify or consider mission-specific requirements,” including local sea conditions and beach topography.

This lack of localized planning, coupled with an absence of Gaza-specific intelligence, significantly hampered the project’s ability to adapt to the maritime environment.

The IG made several recommendations to prevent similar failures in the future. These include creating a dedicated working group to assess JLOTS readiness, improved coordination between Army, Navy, and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and comprehensive reviews of current capabilities and resource gaps.

While TRANSCOM partially concurred with the findings, the IG criticized its response as inadequate and has requested a full report detailing how it plans to fulfill its coordinating responsibilities within 30 days.

Ultimately, the Defense Department’s IG report serves as a sobering reminder of what can go wrong when bold military initiatives are launched without sufficient preparation.

Although the Gaza pier mission delivered vital humanitarian aid, its brief lifespan and the multitude of challenges it encountered highlight serious deficiencies that demand attention if similar efforts are to succeed in the future.