Submarines have long been a central element of China’s naval strategy, but according to Chinese military experts, the U.S. underwater surveillance network poses a major threat to their effectiveness.

Some officers within the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, are now calling for a deliberate and systematic effort to dismantle America’s undersea detection system during any potential conflict.

This proposed campaign would include the destruction, sabotage, or manipulation of underwater microphones, along with the use of countermeasures such as undersea drones and China’s vast fleet of commercial fishing vessels.

Ryan Martinson, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote in an essay for the Center for International Maritime Security that Chinese experts believe “the U.S. undersea surveillance system suffers from a number of vulnerabilities, amplified by the sheer scale of the Western Pacific battlespace.” He added, “If enough nodes are degraded, the system as a whole may lose its functionality.”

Here's What They're Not Telling You About Your Retirement

The concerns are striking because American and Chinese perceptions of the undersea balance of power are nearly mirror images of each other.

Washington and its allies remain wary of China’s expanding submarine force, which the Pentagon estimates will reach 65 vessels this year and grow to 80 by 2035.

China already operates six nuclear ballistic missile submarines, six nuclear attack submarines, and a large fleet of conventional submarines armed with anti-ship missiles, including 21 advanced Yuan-class diesel-electric boats.

In contrast, Chinese naval strategists fear that America’s intensive anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, operations have already rendered their own submarines too vulnerable.

This Could Be the Most Important Video Gun Owners Watch All Year

“The PLAN is investing in submarines because it recognizes their tremendous potential deterrent and warfighting value,” Martinson explained.

“That value, however, hinges on the ability of their boats to operate undetected. According to Chinese military experts however, that basic requirement cannot be guaranteed — not even close.”

Martinson’s analysis draws heavily on a November 2023 article in Military Art, an internal Chinese military journal, authored by three PLAN officers. This internal format allowed them to speak with unusual candor.

The article voiced concerns that Chinese submarines are challenged by an “integrated, three-dimensional surveillance system” composed of warships, submarines, aircraft, satellites, underwater drones, the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), and surface vessels towing the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS).

From Beijing’s perspective, this extensive ASW network is an American attempt to achieve “unilateral transparency” beneath the waves. Chinese analysts point to survey ships mapping undersea terrain for better submarine detection and to oceanic surveillance vessels collecting acoustic signatures.

They compare this network to the Cold War-era chokepoints like the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, where Soviet submarines faced a gauntlet of Western ASW assets. Today, Chinese strategists fear similar barriers could block their access to vital sea lanes and jeopardize their nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

According to the Military Art article, “The probability that PRC submarines are discovered when leaving port is extremely high. There is a fairly high probability that PRC submarines will be detected and intercepted while operating in the Near Seas.”

Martinson called this a “devastating indictment of the operational effectiveness of China’s submarine force.”

While it is possible these officers may be emphasizing U.S. ASW prowess to secure resources or encourage more aggressive maritime policies, Bryan Clark of the Hudson Institute and a former U.S. Navy submarine officer believes “their overall assessment is realistic.”

Clark noted that “The U.S. IUSS network of fixed arrays and SURTASS ships has been effective at tracking submarines in important areas for decades.”

China’s focus on countering America’s vast ASW capability fits into a broader trend of targeting the U.S. military’s interconnected systems. The Military Art article argues that China’s improved conventional forces have already made it harder for U.S. aircraft and ships to operate close to Chinese waters.

More importantly, the authors advocate targeting specific nodes in the U.S. ASW network. They identify undersea cables and arrays as “fairly fragile and easily severed” and label U.S. command-and-control systems as the “Achilles heel” of the network. These could be attacked physically or through cyberwarfare.

Martinson summarized the authors’ recommendation: “At the level of national strategy, China needs to combine both defensive measures and countermeasures, but it must place greater emphasis on countermeasures. That means prioritizing the development of capabilities needed to ‘attack and damage’ the U.S. undersea surveillance system.”

These capabilities might include locating hidden undersea sensors using acoustic, magnetic, optical, and electronic methods, enhanced by artificial intelligence, as well as deploying unmanned underwater vehicles to destroy U.S. arrays.

Clark, however, questioned how easily China could execute such operations.

“The PLA could easily attack deployed SURTASS ships at the onset of a conflict and maybe attack small vehicles or fixed arrays that support IUSS,” he said. “The operation, however, would take forces away from other missions and could require a substantial amount of time.”

He also stressed that “Finding small items in the water column or near the seabed is difficult. The operation would also keep PLA undersea forces inside the first island chain when they are better used outside the island chain during a conflict.”

Nevertheless, vulnerabilities do exist. Clark suggested that China might have more success by overwhelming the IUSS through a massive submarine deployment before hostilities begin, knowing that U.S. forces would lack the numbers to track every vessel.

Whether China’s leadership will follow the advice of its naval strategists is uncertain. However, Martinson warned that “they are being discussed by serious experts,” meaning U.S. Navy leaders must treat them as more than hypothetical scenarios.

In the evolving strategic competition beneath the Pacific waves, the undersea realm remains a place where perception, preparation, and preemption will determine the balance of power.

Warning: Account balances and purchasing power no longer tell the same story. Know in 2 minutes if your retirement is working for you.