When America goes to war, it traditionally prefers to take the fight to the enemy. As Gen. George S. Patton once declared, “Nobody ever defended anything successfully.

There is only attack and attack and attack some more.” His words capture the aggressive mindset that has long defined U.S. military doctrine.

Yet history reminds us that America has not always been on the offensive. For six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military was forced into retreat after retreat.

In the Philippines, Gen. Douglas MacArthur oversaw a withdrawal that ended in the surrender at Bataan in May 1942.

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At the same time, isolated outposts at Wake Island and Guam fell quickly, while the battered U.S. fleet avoided large battles and relied instead on hit-and-run tactics until the nation could fully mobilize for war.

Today, one Army officer believes the United States may once again need to rediscover the art of the fighting retreat. In a recent essay for Military Review, Maj. Patrick Smith warned that the balance of power in the Pacific is shifting. “Fading advantages in firepower, distributed forces, and the growing operational reach of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) require an expansion of operational thought,” he wrote. “The joint force must consider methods of retrograde to shape advantages in time, space, and force.”

Smith highlights several vulnerabilities in America’s current posture. “Small constellations of U.S. elements — ashore and afloat — encircle the looming mass of mainland China,” he observed.

“Operating on tenuous exterior lines, they are vulnerable to defeat in detail by a prodigious array of standoff munitions or blockade.”

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According to Smith, resupply missions are difficult under the shadow of Chinese long-range weapons, and the U.S. lacks large reserves of personnel and ammunition positioned close to the theater.

Furthermore, regional partners may waver in their willingness to support U.S. forces, making some deployments politically unsustainable.

Sealift, the ability to transport large numbers of troops and supplies by sea, is another concern.

Smith argued that “glaring training shortfalls in crisis response, worsened by maintenance deficiencies, compromise U.S. capacity to conduct amphibious actions.”

Without reliable sealift, the U.S. could find itself unable to reinforce or evacuate forces in a contested environment.

Of all military operations, retreating under fire is perhaps the most difficult. Smith points to several American precedents, from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War and World War II.

The Philippines campaign of 1941 is particularly instructive.

MacArthur planned a gradual withdrawal into the Bataan peninsula, hoping to hold out until reinforcements arrived. While his leadership remains controversial, the six-month stand did delay Japanese plans.

The flaw was logistical. “Strategic planners failed to prioritize sealift as the American Filipino force grimly gave way,” Smith noted. The lack of transport meant that the promised relief force never materialized, and the defenders were left isolated.

He compared this with the Continental Army’s narrow escape at the Battle of Long Island in 1776, when Massachusetts fishermen ferried George Washington’s troops across the East River to safety.

Similarly, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in 1864 managed a complex withdrawal across the James River by deceiving Confederate forces into looking elsewhere.

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These examples show that a successful retreat requires foresight, deception, and logistical preparation.

For Smith, America must relearn these lessons.

“Fighting withdrawals and delays will be sharpened arrows in the quiver of operational leaders campaigning in the early stages of a Pacific fight,” he wrote.

Choosing positions that can endure repeated blows while degrading enemy strength would be essential. He also stressed the importance of deception. Just as Grant confused Gen. Robert E. Lee with feints, demonstrations, and false advances, modern forces could use similar tactics to stall the PLA and buy time for maneuver.

Smith envisions a widely distributed force that presents China with a dilemma, forcing the PLA to spread its resources thin. Adroit maneuvers, carefully timed withdrawals, and deception could offset the advantages of Chinese numbers and firepower.

Still, many Americans instinctively side with Patton’s preference for offense. Eric Heginbotham of MIT’s Center for International Studies said that while retreat is important, the greater challenge lies in absorbing and delivering strikes.

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“In contrast to 1941, the situation in the Pacific today has to do largely with long-range fires and our ability to survive adversary ones while conducting our own,” he explained.

Heginbotham criticized the U.S. for failing to harden its Pacific airbases against missile attacks and for neglecting to build flexible logistics systems that could function under fire.

“This has a bit less to do with retrograde per se, than not putting our forces forward in highly vulnerable positions,” he said. Dispersing U.S. forces more widely would reduce their vulnerability.

At the same time, he agreed that knowing how to execute a fighting withdrawal remains essential. “One advantage we do enjoy in the Pacific is maritime depth and the ability to engage where and when we want,” Heginbotham noted.

“In contrast, the Chinese fleet is up against a continent. It has nowhere to run or hide and is, in effect, in the shooting gallery from day one.”

In other words, retreat may not be glamorous, but it can be decisive. As America confronts the realities of a rising China, learning when and how to withdraw could be as important as knowing how to attack.

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